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From the dawn of history, man has 
been a creature apart, constantly stri­
ving to lift himself above his animal 
state by sparks of superior intelli­
gence. His ability to think and adapt 
may have added a certain undefinable 
distinctive urge towards order and 
simple geometry, arising also from the 
fact that all the animal and vegetable 
world surrounding him sprang from 
basic forms and processes. Once 
primitive man emerged from his cave, 
altered requirements of shelter, sur­
vival and food compelled him to adapt 
his environment as never before. The 
moment man wove some artificial 
pattern on the crust of mother earth, 
whether for crops or ritual, a new 
dimension was established between his 
geometry and the natural landscape. 
Whether regular or irregular, beautiful 
or chaotic, the first primitive group 
settlements were man’s first steps in 
spatial organization and built form. 
Thus the geometry of man versus the 
biology of nature is an exciting factor 
in the recent history of our universe. 
Zucher (1959) speaks of, “mankind’s 
generic urge for order and regularity 
in contrast to the chaotic growth of 
nature”.
Arising from this introductory para­
graph, it will be seen that “form” is 
an elusive term, which has been used 
at various times to denote shape, 
geometry or process, the sum of 
evolutionary forces acting in the bio­
logical world. Unlike the simple form 
of a work of art or an artifact of 
society, an urban environment, to­
gether with its constituent human 
population, is so complex that accurate 
description depends on information 
regarding the underlying forces. Even 
if urban form can be described in 
terms of deterministic forces or pro­
cesses, the task of identifying and 
synthesizing them is formidable. Some 
general definition of form is now
called for, before the other compo­
nents, “urban” and “philosophical” 
are used to modify and qualify it.
1 DEFINITION OF FORM
In the 13th and 14th Centuries, form 
referred to the external, morphological 
aspects of an object, as well as its 
aesthetic attributes, The perceived 
structure or image of an object was 
divorced from its imputed aesthetic.
In the early 19th Century, the ques­
tionable division of form and content 
gave rise to theories based on two 
concepts: the rational, real and objec­
tive versus the non-rational, ideal and 
subjective. The split between the ideal 
and the realistic was consolidated by 
separate education for arts and sci­
ences, introduced at the end of the 
18th Century. First the Ecole Poly­
technique was established in Paris and 
then the Ecole des Beaux Artes. In 
1917 D ’Arcy Thompson published On 
Growth and Form (Bonnet 1961) on 
the environmental factors limiting the 
size of various organisms and their 
frequency of movement:
“Any portion of matter, whether it 
be living or dead, and the changes 
of form which are apparent in its 
movement and growth, may in all 
cases be described as due to the 
action of force ... the form o f an 
object is a diagram o f forces" (au­
thor’s emphasis).
To the musician form means themes, 
instrumental forces, time signatures 
and keys, while an astronomer thinks 
of the composition of galaxies and the 
forces of light-years. To the choreo­
grapher form may mean the fusion of 
movement, music, colour and spatial 
sequence.
2 NORMATIVE AND CUL­
TURAL INFLUENCES ON 
FORM
The role of culture in shaping attitudes 
towards form is important, because 
one can often find a parallel between 
definitions of form and current philo­
sophies. The ancient Greeks were 
among the first people to study form 
from a philosophical point of view. 
Plato believed that values were pure 
form while Aristotle distinguished 
between form and matter. The Greeks 
conceived the universe as a rational, 
ordered pattern of events, and it is not 
surprising that they made great ad­
vances in mathematical form such as 
geometry, algebra, trigonometry and 
philosophy. In urban form, Hoppoda- 
mus of Miletus introduced the “ration­
ality and absolute regularity” of the 
gridiron plan from Egypt and the East 
(Van Zyl 1963). Romanticism, first a 
literary movement, produced transcen- 
dentalist attitudes in art, architecture 
and urban planning. Futurism began as 
a positive orientation to modem life 
and ended with forms expressing the 
essence of speed and power. Phenom­
enology, a revolutionary philosophy of 
the early 20th Century, grew out of 
Darwin’s evolution and was concerned 
with the essence of things, as reflected 
in the organic form of many plans.
The historian is well aware of the 
need to show correlations between 
socio-economic forces, the philosophi­
cal attitudes and the physical environ­
ment prevailing at a particular period 
in time. Sir John Summerson (1966) 
suggested the magnitude and impor­
tance of the necessary effort:
“It is the study of urban form as a 
resultant of complex social, psy­
chological and economic forms 
(forces?) which is the essence of 
the kind of history I am postula­
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ting.”
This definition would come closer to 
my own view, if we substitute the 
word “forces” in the second line. 
From a general definition of form, the 
argument has moved into a more 
specifically urban context. There can 
be no universal concept of urban 
form, and so many branches of know­
ledge have described the city, that it 
would be presumptuous to be original 
or comprehensive.
3 TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF 
URBAN FORM
Urban form refers to the density and 
distribution of activities as a function 
of locus in the urban area. Fleischer’s 
definition (1966) emphasizes both the 
spatial and the functional, without any 
normative overtones. Surely there is a 
richer view of urban form?
“Urban form describes the rela­
tionships which exist between the 
components of the urban system. It 
may be both physical (spatial) and 
non-physical (aspatial). The resi­
dential form of the city may be 
described in physical terms, while 
the economic form of the city may 
be described in non-physical (aspa­
tial) terms.”
Batchelor (1968) introduced the impor­
tant concept of “system” with its 
input-output-feedback connotations for 
the city. Furthermore, he is emphasiz­
ing a balance between form and pro­
cess, the ideal and the realistic. In the 
previous definition of form we have 
“the diagram of forces” in the back­
ground. Indeed, the spatial arrange­
ment of the city is by no means a 
closed system. Normative and cultural 
influences must also be taken into 
account, and a Mumford (1938) defi­
nition of urban form would include 
non-physical (aspatial) aspects.
“The city in its complete sense 
then, is a geographic plexus, an 
economic organization, an institu­
tional process, a theatre of social 
action and an aesthetic symbol of 
collective unity. ”
These definitions of Mumford, Sum- 
merson, Fleischer and others show 
that terms are needed to build a bridge
between the spatial and aspatial con­
cerns of urban form. When urban 
planners talk of “guiding develop­
ment” they usually mean spatial orga­
nization, e.g. in May 1970 the govern­
ment of Ontario produced its Design 
fo r  Development in the Toronto- 
centred region. Apart from alliteration 
in this title, the word “design” is 
significant, as it seems to suggest a 
synthesis or policy statement on de­
sirable forms and functions in that 
urban region. However, philosophers, 
sociologists or political scientists might 
have a very different, aspatial view of 
urban process, more analytical or 
abstract and overlooking design of any 
sort. In our “fundamentally democra­
tized” society (Mannheim), it is im­
portant to relate values and aspects of 
the physical environment as held by 
the urban community at large. Al­
though values tend to be vague and 
elusive, in conditions of urban growth 
and change they need to be articu­
lated. Assisted by the philosopher, 
planner or politician or by social 
animation, the urban community may 
come up with a set of goals (input), 
which may or may not end up as a 
physical form (output), depending on 
the intervening feedback!
In an approach to spatial structure, 
Foley (1964) and the Berkeley group 
use terms and definitions which are 
pertinent to the themes of this paper. 
Their terminology includes key words 
and combinations as follows: “spatial 
and aspatial” , “form and process” and 
the trio, “normative, functional and 
physical”. Here is how they disting­
uish between “spatial and aspatial” :
“Spatial refers to a direct concern 
for the pattern in which culture, 
activities, people and physical 
objects are distributed in space. ”
“Aspatial refers to a lack of such 
concern for spatial pattern ... the 
characteristics and interrelation­
ships of selected phenomena. ”
For the purpose of this paper a dis­
tinction will also be made between 
“form” and “process” , because the 
urban structure comprises both formal 
(static) aspects and procedural (dy­
namic) aspects. Form and process may 
then be treated as two complementary 
versions of “structure” .
In addition to viewing urban form 
from the two major division of “spa­
tial” and “aspatial” , it is also useful to 
examine the trio, “normative, func­
tional and physical” as a qualifying 
cross-reference classification:
3.1 Normative or Cultural As­
pects
These include the rules by which men 
live and the processes sparking con­
sensus. The cultural component (al­
ready dealt with) assumes many tacit 
understandings, BUT varies widely ra­
cially and geographically. Normative 
aspects include both goal formulation 
and approved means of goal-seeking.
3.2 Functional Organization As­
pects
These deal with the distribution of 
activities, linkages, production and 
distribution systems, services and 
establishments, in the city. Functional 
organization holds the balance between 
our norms and values, and physical 
planning.
3.3 Physical Aspects
These embrace the geophysical base of 
community life, buildings and people 
occupying space, in short “permanent 
or semi-permanent structure that house 
or channel urban activities/move­
ment” .
Some of these terms and definitions 
can be simplified into a diagram con­
sisting of six cells (Figure 1). A series 
of vertical and horizontal relationships 
can then be traced through these cells, 
according to one’s personal philoso­
phy, e.g. spatial-normative or aspatial- 
physical. The subject of this paper 
would seem to be “primary concern 
for values as to spatial arrangement of 
the city” and it is traced by an arrow 
flowing from cell 1A to 3B, through 
cells IB and 2B. An alternative might- 
be a direct relationship between values 
(1A and IB) and the physical environ­
ment (3B) (dotted line).
It is now time to feed some of the 
previous definitions into the second 
major division of this paper, the philo­
sophical component.
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FIGURE 1: Conceptual Diagram fo r  Evaluating City Form. 
(Source: Foley 1964)
4 SOME CONTRASTING PH I­
LOSOPHIES
The Pocket Oxford Dictionary (1960) 
defines “philosophy” as:
“The pursuit of wisdom, the know­
ledge of things and their causes 
(natural, moral) ... the study of 
ultimate realities and general prin­
ciples ... a system of theories on 
the nature of things ... rules for 
the conduct of life.”
I find words like “things” , “ultimate 
realities and general principles” ex­
tremely vague until qualified or related 
to a particular branch of knowledge. 
However there is a ray of hope in 
discussing natural things which occupy 
space (spatial) and moral principles 
(aspatial), which might be stretched to 
include urban form. While their utility 
is not disputed, space and time do not 
permit an examination of the nature of 
cities as described by writers such as 
Zola (Paris), Dickens (London),
O Henry and Damon Runyon (New 
York), Boccaccio and Moravia 
(Rome). Instead an arbitrary, personal 
selection of philosophies relating more 
directly to urban form will be offered. 
The order may not necessarily be 
strictly chronological, but the criteria, 
spatial-aspatial, form-process and 
normative, functional and physical will 
be loosely applied.
4.1 Ecology
The value system which is the Wes­
tern inheritance is exploitive, and its 
utility has continuously declined to the 
point where it is now an obstruction to 
survival, success and fulfilment. We 
need another ethos to replace that of 
the vandal: this we can find in ecolo­
gy. We need more and better know­
ledge of the operation of physical and 
biological process in order that we 
may predict and formulate choice 
(McHarg 1967).
This libation to ecology is in the tradi­
tion of the Puritan ethic, and hovers 
between the aspatial-normative and 
spatial-physical. It is a fitting introduc­
tion to the Scottish biologist-sociolo- 
gist-planner, Geddes, who was in the 
mainstream of the philosophical fer­
ment in the last half of the Victorian 
era. Darwin’s Origin o f the Species
had a profound influence on him, 
especially the ecological aspects of 
interaction between people and place. 
Geddes proposed spatial-physical 
concepts of growth and change, but 
never himself studied cities in the 
depth which he advocated, and sketch­
ed out a concept of the evolution of 
cities in close parallel with Mumford. 
His goal was to make the transition 
from the Paleotechnic age of slums, 
wars, poverty and exhaustible re­
sources to the Neotechnic era of co­
operation, humanism and true wealth. 
He saw regional planning as a major 
process for social transition, but first 
one had to develop the synoptic view. 
Exhaustive surveys of the past and 
present would help to develop future 
plans (Gertler 1969).
McKaye fits between Geddes and 
Mumford, and all three shared the 
ideal of creating a balance between the 
onslaught of industrialization and the 
indigenous environment. McKaye 
leaned on urban concepts peculiar to 
New England such as structural unity 
and cosmopolitanism. His thesis was 
that the breakdown of indigenous, 
regional culture would in time rob the 
city of its human environmental re­
sources. To him the indigenous is 
what stays while the city is a mouth 
that receives industrial flow and also
“a mother of traffic streams” . His is a 
spatial-physical philosophy with func­
tional overtones when he describes 
water, traffic and culture as “outflow, 
reflow, inflow and backflow“. Being 
influenced by the transcendentalism of 
Kant and Emerson as opposed to a 
mechanistic concept of the universe 
derived from Newton, MacKaye be­
lieved also that man is not a powerless 
victim of circumstance, but should 
build on the laws of nature and adapt 
to his environment.
“Balance, autonomy, symbiosis, direc­
tional development, ecological partner­
ship and the hierarchy” are all phrases 
that belie the deep pessimism of 
Mumford’s philosophy (1961). His is 
a strong spatial-normative-physical 
approach coloured by organic termi­
nology.
“Failing to divide its social chro­
mosomes into new cells, each 
bearing some portion of the origi­
nal inheritance, the city continues 
to grow inorganically, indeed 
cancerously, by a continuous 
breaking down of old tissues. The 
form of the metropolis is formless­
ness.”
According to Mumford then the city 
should seek salvation in its social
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institutions. Like Stein and Perry, he 
places great weight on the neighbour­
hood unit (about 5 000 people), and in 
addition has notions of an optimum 
size for cities (30 000 to 300 000). 
Not only are there to be population 
limits, but residential density should 
not exceed 100 per acre. His delight­
ful concepts of open space, varying in 
scale from micro to macro would cater 
for both introvert and extrovert. Every 
city should have secluded spots, to 
which man can make temporary with­
drawal for spiritual refreshment. 
Mumford (1953) agrees with Howard 
and the Garden City philosophy, with 
reservations:
“Because the new town planners 
were mainly in revolt against 
congestion and squalor, rather than 
in love with urban order and co­
operation, new towns do not yet 
adequately reveal what the modem 
city should be.”
“Planning for the phases of life” is a 
Mumford phrase, and shows that he is 
one of the few philosophers concerned 
about the changing needs, mobility 
and environmental balance of man, on 
his journey from infancy to senility. 
Mumford (1949), the eternal human­
ist, pleads for a community to be a 
“constantly varying combination of a 
multitude of associative activities” , 
varying in strength and duration and 
progressing through the life-cycle 
from birth to death. Not only is 
Mumford emphasizing the necessity of 
choice (for which McHarg was plead­
ing), but he is asking us to remember 
human behaviour and values in our 
urban institutions. There are other 
views.
4.2 The Good City
In discussing some aspatial-normative 
aspects of urban form, Haworth 
(1963) states as a wish to:
“Develop a systematic theory of 
urban life, connecting it at the one 
end with the ethical principles that 
underlie the ideal of a good city, 
and at the other end with the prac­
tical discipline of city planning ... 
a concrete program for fulfilment 
of the ideal.”
His good city is a complex of institu­
tions offering citizens both community 
and opportunity, and on the personal 
level, opportunity and community turn 
into growth or self-realization, duty or 
obligation. Personal growth is aided if 
urban institutions have both moral 
power and freedom. An institution has 
moral power if it offers variety of 
opportunity (richness) ease of partici­
pation (openness) and continuity of 
membership. Freedom is another 
attribute of institutions, if they are to 
aid personal growth, but Haworth 
doubts that flexibility can be much 
increased in urban areas.
One has the feeling that Haworth’s 
system of analysis could only result if 
all urban institutions shared common 
values. The physical plan which 
Haworth advocates is the neighbour­
hood unit, integrated socio-economi- 
cally and qualified by the institutions 
discussed in the previous paragraph. 
This is the same neighbourhood con­
cept of Perry and Mumford, which 
has been challenged in our age of 
mobility by the proponents of non­
territorial networks. However, as a 
philosopher, Haworth wishes to define 
the urban form in terms of opportunity 
and community: a sociologist might 
define the urban goal in terms of 
ecology or ethnology: a political scien­
tist in terms of equality and liberty: 
and an economist in terms of welfare, 
externalities or utility. In a different 
way each clarifies urban form, but 
hopefully all are dedicated to maxi­
mizing freedom of choice. As Fiser 
says (1962):
“There is no ideal city, no single
design which is universally best. ”
4.3 Technology and Cybernetics
“Technology creates new possibilities 
for human choice and action, but 
leaves their disposition uncertain ... 
thus makes possible a future (city) of 
open-ended options” (Mesthene 1967).
Society can be thought of in terms of 
power (muscular or political) and it is 
precisely this power that makes possi­
ble the creation of new urban forms to 
fit new social processes. In simplistic 
terms this power derives from adding 
together three power components basic 
to man: hand, mind and tools (techno­
logy). Even rudimentary technology
can multiply the power of a two-man 
team several hundred times. To orga­
nize individuals and their tools to­
gether into large societies has been a 
hallmark of all advanced civilizations. 
Imagine building the Pyramids of 
Egypt without the aid of the lever and 
wheel.
Since the turn of this century, a stag­
gering new rate and scale of techno­
logical change has set in, and there 
has been an upsurge in the application 
of technology to the solution of socio­
economic and political problems. 
During the Second World War even 
greater impetus was given to an inter­
disciplinary philosophy applicable to 
exceedingly complex systems of tech­
nology. Whereas Gibbs and Einstein 
had changed the course of physics, 
electronics are changing our society 
this moment. In 1947 a group of 
scientists with a common interest in 
the theory of control and communica­
tions launched their “brandnew” Field 
of Cybernetics, defined by Weiner 
(1967) as:
“The science of control and com­
munications in both the animal and 
the machine.”
We are always fighting nature’s ten­
dency to degrade the organized and 
destroy the meaningful, what Gibbs 
called increasing entropy. Messages, 
themselves are a form of pattern and 
organization, and subject to entropy 
like cities: Michael (1962) indicates 
the spatial implications of cybernetics:
“Widely dispersed installations can 
be co-ordinated and controlled 
from still another place ... can 
interact with each other and affect 
one another’s performance as 
easily, in many cases, as if they 
were all in the same place.”
In dealing with social systems with 
man as the ultimate self-regulating 
component, we are up against peren­
nial philosophic problems. Social 
systems like cities should not only 
respond to existing environmental 
challenges, but plan to cope with them 
in the future. Much social choice 
depends upon the image of the future 
deemed desirable by society, and this 
includes urban form. The ordering of 
social choice through the wise deploy­
ment of technology asks for a high
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level of rational behaviour. Yet one of 
the results of the cybernetic revolution 
is an increase in value conflict and 
confusion, as illustrated by the new 
spirit of militancy, morality and com­
petitive leisure. A pluralistic society 
must accommodate both group and 
individual needs, yet achieve political 
maturity through a humane technol­
ogy. Massey (1967) warns that:
“We must never permit a machine 
to make an important decision 
affecting human beings, except 
under the control of human be­
ings.”
But even then, relations between the 
public, technocrats and politicians are 
indeed critical. Hardin (1969) asks 
that any new socio-economic systems 
should have self-correcting mecha­
nisms built into them:
“In a planned economy, planners 
who make errors are likely deliber­
ately to interfere with the free flow 
of information in order to save 
their skins. Can a planned system 
(city?) include uncloggable chan­
nels of communication?”
Technology has both positive and 
negative effects at one and the same 
time, and often has to start by curing 
the ills of previous progress, e.g. the 
economic growth “miracles” which 
have brought air, water and noise 
pollution. Dechert (1967) suggests that 
the most critical ethical challenge to 
this generation will be to determine 
the social values to be served by 
cybernetics.
A major question, however, still 
hinges about mankind’s transition from 
an old to a new system. Important 
social reform during the past 70 years 
has been slow, involving great human 
suffering and waste. In general transi­
tions seem more feasible for small 
populations than large, but there are 
fewer small, uncomplicated cities of 
the Ebenezer Howard type. Gertler 
(1970) sees this cultural lag, and hints 
at a sinister environmental lag.
“The theorist of the post-industrial 
society, sees a lag in the develop­
ment of the cultural values, organi­
zational philosophies and ecological 




After the previous normative\aspatial 
section on technology, it is reasonable 
to examine a small sample of func­
tional-spatial concepts, if only to 
restore balance to this paper. Where 
better to start than with Lynch and 
Rodwin (1958) whose city is “adapted 
space” for the accommodation of 
human activities and flow systems for 
goods and people. They devote their 
main effort to flow systems which 
they equate with urban form, and this 
agrees with Figure 1. This work 
begins with the study of urban form, 
moves on to the specification of goals 
and finally draws upon goal-form 
analysis to indicate the nature of the 
planner’s task. On the one hand, goals 
of urban form are concerned with 
man-to-man and man-to-environment, 
and on the other hand with efficient 
relationships, i.e. maximizing the 
return and minimizing the cost in a 
socio-economic sense. The sequence 
from goal formulation to form analysis 
is treated as a continuous dynamic 
relationship. As an aside, it is interest­
ing to note that Young (1966) defines 
planning as “the process of defining 
goals and designing means by which 
the goals may be achieved” .
Webber’s philosophy provides a broad 
framework for describing the city 
which is explanatory rather than nor­
mative. He uses interaction as the 
basic concept and finds two perspec­
tives, where it occurs either in a 
particular metropolitan community or 
in widely scattered places all over the 
globe, “place and non-place” commu­
nities respectively. To distinguish 
them from the urban place, non-place 
communities are called “urban 
realms”, which will render most 
megalopoli obsolete (as we know 
them) and give rise to a new sport 
among the jet set, which Gross calls: 
“mobiletics” . Webber (1964) says that 
the city is a dynamic system in action, 
traced through “linkages” and “depen­
dency ties”, and relating individuals, 
groups and firms. This aspatial view 
of linkages involves three items:
(a) Spatial patterns of Human
Interactions - communications,
people and goods.
(b) The Physical Form of a city - 
space adapted for human activi­
ties, the networks of communi­
cation and channels of transpor­
tation.
(c) The city as a diagram of Activ­
ity Locations - spatial distribu­
tion of economic, social or
other functions.
4.5 Selected Spatial-Physical 
Approaches
“Today we must regain by conscious 
effort, the essential unity o f function 
and form. It is not a question of in­
venting the “city beautiful”. It is a 
question of discovering the forms that 
will most clearly give expression to 
the functions of our cities.” This 
Blumenfeld quote (1967), appeals for 
the discovery of unity of function and 
form and links back to Webber: it 
agrees with my argument and it is also 
a fitting link to the last major philo­
sophical category in this paper, the 
spatial-physical, which might very 
well deal with the “city beautiful”!! In 
their tour de force, the Whites (1962) 
show that philosophies of the Ameri­
can city are divisible into two stages. 
In the first, romanticism was em­
ployed in attacking the city for being 
over-civilized. In the second stage, the 
city was accused of being under-civi­
lized by anti- or non-romantics. Where 
better to start than with Frank Lloyd 
Wright, who combined both extremes?
Wright (1958) had a philosophy of 
urban life which preferred to ride the 
gloomy wave of history. He asserted 
with Jefferson that the city is a cancer 
and the home of “mobocarcy” and the 
“Broadway creed” . His task was 
therefore, “to take away all urban 
structure and depravity ... and then 
absorb and regenerate the tissue poi­
soned by cancerous growth” . The 
Whites (1962) note:
“Wright rarely spoke with anything 
like the feeling that Dewey, Park 
and Jane Addams shared for neigh­
bourly contact ... urban conversa­
tion.
Wright seemed to think that mod­
em  technology was sweeping away 
the need for the face-to-face rela­
tions that had characterized the
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earlier city ... the city would be 
swept away with it. ”
However, at some point Wright 
thought that the city planner should 
put things together again by employing 
the double-barrelled strategies of 
“decenter and re-integrate” . The city 
of the future (Broadacre City) would 
be “everywhere and nowhere” , em­
brace the country and become the 
nation.
This decentralized non-city is a ro­
mantic dream fleeing from social and 
economic realities, the concept of a 
nature-lover to whom urbanity is 
alien, e.g. “brutal, impersonal Chi­
cago” . In Wright’s system a city must 
be achieved in one inspirational, artis­
tic stroke! His Mile-High Illinois 
Tower is a static, inflexible vertical 
city, ignoring all those aspatial-norma- 
tive aspects which give richness to 
comprehensive planning. In the wri­
tings of Gropius (1955) there are 
elements of organic theory strikingly 
similar to Wright’s, e.g. “Land, 
nature, man and his art as one great 
entity” . Whereas Wright (1949) might 
have hailed Gropius as an ally, he 
attacked him for his concept of team­
work (so vital to comprehensive plan­
ning) and belittled his educational 
experiments, “minor mirror-sects 
leading into or out of one Bauhaus ... 
having a cart but no horse” . Wright 
also preferred to ignore another great 
architect, Le Corbusier; yet the philo­
sophy of a new urban form, “the 
skyscraper in the park” will forever be 
associated with these two men.
“Corbusier has two contrasting con­
cepts of the city.” (Moholy Nagy 
1968)
“(a) Machine-made, standardised, 
bureacratised, technically per­
fect.
(b) Natural environment, visual
space, sunlight, air, foliage and
views. ”
Corbusier’s City for 3 Million of 1992 
was the beginning of two decades of 
intense planning experimentation, 
continuing with La Ville Radieuse and 
Le Plan Voisin, and all dedicated to 
finding “the absolute measure that 
orders all things” . Yet in his Voisin, 
he tore down much of the historic core
of Paris, like a latter-day Baron 
Haussmann, and packed a rich variety 
of activities into rectilinear skyscra­
pers. The slabs and towers rising from 
Corbusier’s Elysian fields, hills and 
valleys were “vertical villages” , self- 
contained with shops, kindergartens 
and playgrounds on the roofs. In the 
new capital of the Punjab, Chandi­
garh, he adopted a Radbum layout 
(pedestrian separation) with a series of 
neighbourhood super-blocks, all in the 
Cartesian manner. However, a visit to 
Chandigarh today reveals an Asian 
population housed in alien Western 
forms. It is those awkward aspatial- 
normative factors at work against him! 
Monster government buildings (senate, 
supreme court) are totally separated 
from the city that they are meant to 
serve.
In 1943 Corbusier and the Ascoral 
group were already suggesting a plan­
ned Megalopolis, a continuous build­
up spine extending throughout Europe 
and possibly into Asia, thus anticipa­
ting Ecumenopolis and the philosophy 
of yet another spatial-physical planner, 
Doxiades. The initial appeal of his 
ekistic philosophy is its breadth of 
scale, ranging from micro to macro. 
At the one extreme, Doxiadis uses the 
“human community” as a unit of 
urban form. It is pedestrian-scale, may 
not be crossed by motorised traffic, 
contains daily shopping and primary 
schools, and has a maximum horizon­
tal dimension of one kilometre. At the 
other extreme we have Ecumenopolis, 
a city covering the entire earth in a 
continuous system of linear expansion 
with regular nodes.
“Human happiness, unity of purpose, 
hierarchy of functions, four dimen­
sions and many scales for many 
masters” comprise the five principles 
of this science of human settlements. 
Yet ekistics is essentially an outline of 
Doxiadis’ personal experience, and the 
generalizations which result from 
treating a vast range of human and 
urban phenomena often seem like 
truisms. Spreiregen (1965) hints that 
the five elements of the ekistic grid 
(nature, man, society, shells and 
networks) are reminiscent of the old 
Congres International d’Architecture 
Modeme (C1AM). This suggests that 
ekistics is more of an art than a sci­
ence, but let Doxiadis (1968) himself 
speak:
“No progress is possible unless we 
are able to make an hypothesis: 
and progress is easier if experience 
and intuition help us to select the 
proper hypothesis or close to it. ”
What then is the ultimate challenge in 
developing philosophies of urban 
form?
4.6 Challenge: A Philosophy of 
City Change
This paper suggests that urban form is 
a process state. Some see at least four 
stages of city building namely survey, 
analysis, plan and implementation, and 
these should be part of a cyclic or 
system concept. As the planning pro­
cess unfolds in time, urban form may 
emerge and diversify, changing from 
the general to the particular, and 
becoming a task for many (Smithson, 
1967):
“The realization of the actual town 
should be in the hands of the 
builders of the parts, who, under­
standing the general intention, must 
at every stage assess what has gone 
before, and mutate the whole. ”
Assuming that the builders of the parts 
have a common understanding which 
is an uncommon thing, then the dy­
namic city, evolving in time, becomes 
Crane’s City of a Thousand Design­
ers. These “builders and designers” 
are not literal!!
There is a risk that simplistic philoso­
phies and geometrical patterns of 
urban form will be evolved on the 
basis of selected facts and a complex 
web of unstated assumptions. Ye:t it is 
exactly the unstated which needs clari­
fication if we are to understand the 
many theories of serious students of 
the city. In such studies as Davidoff 
and Reiner’s “Choice Theory”, Dyck- 
man’s “Decision Theory” or the 
dynamic simulation model of the 
Penn-Jersey Transportation Study we 
have a forecast of the way in which 
philosophies may be devised to keep 
pace with the fluid situation of the real 
world. Fagin (1963) bridges the gap 
between form and process, the spatial 
and aspatial:
“The ultimate master plan map as 
the goal o f planning is being re-
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placed by a planning process ... the 
master plan is regarded as an open- 
ended sequence of plans describing at 
each successive point in time a desir­
able equilibrium among ever-changing 
activities. ”
This concept involves time as well as 
change, the normative and the func­
tional.
Commenting on the impermanent 
aspects of our civilization, Hechscher 
(1962) suggests that attention should 
be lavished upon those public works 
which are most permanent and widely 
loved. Public sponsorship of works 
merely serving special interests, e.g. 
highways for car owners, would have 
lower priority.
In a related vein, Mumford (1962) has 
implied that civic design emerges 
when civilization enjoys some surplus 
and can aspire to forms which are 
more than utilitarian. Galbraith’s 
Affluent Society (1958) suggests a city 
more devoted to an economy of men 
and ideas than material production. 
The Athenian view of the city as an 
instrument dedicated to the divine in 
human nature is very fine, but a great 
modem city is more complex and utili­
tarian.
In the planning dialogue between the 
precise forms of permanence and the 
aspatial processes of change, I believe 
that a solution lies in flexibility:
“Just as our mental processes need 
fixed points to enable them to 
classify and value transient infor­
mation, and thus remain sane and 
lucid, so too the city needs 
“fixes”, identifying points within a 
long cycle of change by means of 
which ... a shorter cycle can be 
valued and identified. ”
The Smithsons (1961) labelled the 
polarities between stability and 
change: Fix and Transience. In this 
theory of the City Dynamic (as op­
posed to his City Cosmetic), Crane
(1960) relates the previous extremes to 
the desired characteristics of the plan­
ned city, namely Malleability and 
Predictability. However, he does not 
see a situation of extremes, but rather 
gradations of “hierarchical change in 
permanence” and change “by osmosis 
instead of eruption”.
It is dangerous for planners to be 
preoccupied with a philosophy of cities 
as permanent containers, when their 
contents are volatile people and ideas. 
To accommodate change, therefore, a 
city should be flexible enough to 
contain the seeds of its own destruc­
tion and re-birth. Technology now 
makes disposable cities possible, and 
this opens up exciting vistas of accom­
modating alternative life styles. If the 
permissive city is capable of any form 
according to circumstances, we must 
now determine its “fixes” , namely 
those values and variables of enduring 
need.
As Dewey (1959) said: “The process 
of growth, improvement and progress, 
rather than the static outcome become 
the significant thing. The end is no 
longer a terminus”.
Now let our planning dialogue con­
tinue.
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